By Dewatripont M., Hansen L.P., Turnovsky S.J. (eds.)
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This learn by way of Philip Eubanks demanding situations conventional bills of metaphor and considerably expands theories of "conceptual" metaphor through reading exchange Is struggle because it happens in concrete discourse.
Although scholarly curiosity in metaphor as a classy, linguistic, and cognitive phenomenon has lengthy persisted, Eubanks is one of the first to contemplate metaphor in its sociohistorical position. wondering significant debts of metaphor from Aristotle to the current, Eubanks argues that metaphor is not only motivated by way of yet truly is constituted by way of its concrete operation.
Far-reaching in its implications for our realizing of metaphor, Eubanks's premise allows us to determine metaphor as a sweeping rhetorical entity whilst it money owed for the extra localized operations of metaphor of curiosity to linguists, philosophers of language, and cognitive scientists. offering a brand new version of metaphoric functioning, Eubanks reconsiders the main promising account of metaphor so far, the inspiration of "conceptual metaphor. "
Eubanks specializes in the conceptual metaphor exchange Is War-a metaphor stumbled on anyplace humans talk about company and commerce-to advance his rhetorical version of metaphor. He analyzes alternate Is warfare because it happens in the print information media, on tv dialogue exhibits, in educational works, in renowned nonfiction and novels, in ancient fiscal observation, and in concentration workforce speak. whereas those examples do demonstrate a wealthy sort within the makeup of exchange Is struggle, even more than mere sort is at stake.
Trade Is battle is implicated in a longer and rhetorically complicated dialog with different metaphors and literal techniques: exchange is peace, alternate Is a video game, alternate Is Friendship, exchange is a trip, and Markets Are bins. the popularity and research of this constituting dialog furthers a reevaluation idea. What additionally emerges, in spite of the fact that, is a important portrait of the discourse of exchange itself, a discourse that relies importantly upon a responsive interchange of metaphors.
Not anyone likes paying taxes, less the method of submitting tax returns. For years, would-be reformers have encouraged changing the return-based mass source of revenue tax with a flat tax, federal revenues tax, or a few mix thereof. Congress itself has commissioned reviews at the feasibility of a process of tangible withholding.
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Contexts in which the issue is the amount of damages that should be transferred from one party to another. American seminar audiences typically think this is a natural assumption, but non-Americans often regard it as unduly jaundiced. Of course, we use it as a benchmark only, to develop insight and intuition (just as the lowest price does not win the whole market in most real “Bertrand” markets, but making the extreme assumption is a common and useful starting point). Extensions are possible to cases in which with probability (1 − λ) the “most deserving” party wins, but with probability λ > 0, the biggest spender wins.
Speciﬁcally, let s1A and s1B 20 Maskin be buyer i’s signals for A and B, respectively, and let his valuation functions be v i A (s1A , s2A , s3A ) and v i B (s1B , s2B , s3B ) . Assume that each buyer wants to buy at most one good. Let us ﬁrst ﬁx the signal values of buyers 2 and 3 at levels such that, as we vary s1A and s1B , either (i) it is efﬁcient to allocate good A to buyer 1 and B to 2, or (ii) it is efﬁcient to allocate good A to 2 and B to 3. 3) whereas in case (ii), we have v 1A (s1A , s2A , s3A ) < v 2A (s1A , s2A , s3A ) + v 3B (s1B , s2B , s3B ) − v 2B (s1B , s2B , s3B ).
See, for example, Stevens’ (1994, 2000) models of wage determination in oligopsonistic labor markets, Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1998), Persico (2000) and many others’ political economy models, and many models in ﬁnance (including, of course, takeover battles, to which we give an application in Section 4). Another major area we do not develop here is the application of auction theorists’ understanding of the winner’s curse to adverse selection more generally.
Advances in economics and econometrics, vol. 1 by Dewatripont M., Hansen L.P., Turnovsky S.J. (eds.)